Lally, E. and Rowe, D (2009) ‘Impossible Choices: Complexity and Dissatisfaction in the Telecommunications Consumer–Service Provider Relationship’, Communications Policy & Research Forum 2009. Sydney. (2025)

The papers were volunteered by researchers from around Australia and overseas, in response to the call for submissions earlier in the year. Proposals for papers and talks were refereed by an independent program committee. To ensure impartiality, the committee assessed the proposals without any identification of the authors. These are the committee membersThis was the process, with two main stages. The first stage came after the call for proposals, when all submissions were initially evaluated by the Program Committee. Offers to present papers at the Forum were then made on the basis of that initial evaluation.

Who should really answer the call: regulation of telecommunications

2007

Cette étude a pour objectif de présenter un modèle de classification pour. la. clientèle. âgée. de. 65. ans. et. plus. admise. dans. un. programme. de. réadaptation spécialisée et surspécialisée en déficience visuelle, basé sur les.coûts.complets.d'exploitation..Une.approche.expérimentale.a.permis. de. regrouper. la. clientèle. en. 5. groupes. homogènes. en. ce. qui. concerne. la consommation des ressources financières à partir d'un seul et unique critère discriminant : le niveau fonctionnel de la clientèle à l'entrée dans le.programme.

Achieving consensus at the FCC

Negotiation Journal, 1987

PRAGMATIC VIEWPOINTS ON EMERGING DISPUTES IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR.pdf

The Premature Burial of Telecommunications Reform: A Response to John Quiggin

Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, 1999

Australian telecommunications policy has been the failure to take adequate ac count of natural monopoly' (Quiggin, 1998:428). It is true that there have been significant weaknesses in the performance of the telecommunications industry, and that many of these weaknesses can be attributed to regulatory choices. But it is by no means clear that they have emerged as a result of any natural monopoly in tele communications. Furthermore, it is instructive to compare Quiggin's analysis with that of AT&T, which at the turn of the 20th century convinced regulators that hav ing 4,000 interconnected telecommunications companies resulted in wasteful dupli cation, thus promoting a regulatory regime which created the AT&T monopoly (Mesher & Zajac, 1998). As has often been observed, many countries are opening up their telecommu nications sectors by removing legal restrictions and other entry barriers. Once mar kets are opened in this way, a multitude of telecommunications carriers have chosen to enter. Such rapid and widespread entry into a sector is hardly an indicator of pervasive natural monopoly of the sort Quiggin is concerned about. Quiggin's argument is complex. He proceeds from the contention that any lo cal network in telecommunications constitutes a natural monopoly. He infers from this that die policy decision to support facilities-based competition in Australia, and especially network duplication, was fundamentally misconceived. Thus, a range of policy decisions related to competition in fixed networks, mobile phones, and so forth, were wrong. In his view, mistakes about the technology led to policies that have encouraged wasteful duplication of investment and have dissipated many of the benefits that Australians might otherwise have enjoyed. Finally, he argues that the appropriate policy is to nationalise Telstra, to reserve to that enterprise a legis lated monopoly over local telecommunications infrastructure, and to impose on it common-carrier obligations. A large number of countries have allowed competition at the local level. Entry has been slow but not insignificant

Addressing policy gaps in Australian telecommunications

Telecommunications Journal of Australia, 2011

Warwick Davis, from Frontier Economics, on telecommunications economic regulation. This paper draws attention to the implications of the Australian economic regulator, the ACCC, finally stepping away from the use of hypothetical, and ultimately futile, cost models in setting access prices for Telstra's fixed line network. His paper brings out the implications for the new national broadband company NBN Co, whose broadband access infrastructure will progressively replace Telstra's copper access network. Cite this article as: Gerrand, Peter. 2011. 'Introduction to this issue: NBN policy gaps and Christopher Newell prize papers'. Telecommunications Journal of Australia. 61 (2): p. 14.1. http://tja.org.au.

Major policy gaps in Australian telecommunications

Telecommunications Journal of Australia, 2011

Warwick Davis, from Frontier Economics, on telecommunications economic regulation. This paper draws attention to the implications of the Australian economic regulator, the ACCC, finally stepping away from the use of hypothetical, and ultimately futile, cost models in setting access prices for Telstra's fixed line network. His paper brings out the implications for the new national broadband company NBN Co, whose broadband access infrastructure will progressively replace Telstra's copper access network. Cite this article as: Gerrand, Peter. 2011. 'Introduction to this issue: NBN policy gaps and Christopher Newell prize papers'. Telecommunications Journal of Australia. 61 (2): p. 14.1. http://tja.org.au.

Decision-making procedures ethics rules: The practical enablers of integrity and impartiality in telecommunications regulation

2002

A "Principled" Approach to the Design of Telecommunications Policy

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2010

The Obama administration came into power championing a philosophical shift in regulatory and antitrust policy. The telecommunications industry was singled out by the administration as a case where past regulatory/antitrust policies may have been too permissive. Prominent policy issues slated for (re)examination include forbearance from network unbundling obligations, net neutrality regulation and prospective market failures in the provision of broadband. The principal objective of this article is to develop a set of competition and regulatory principles, firmly grounded in the law and economics literature, that can serve to inform the design of the optimal public policy for the telecommunications sector.

Counting the Casualties of Telecom: The Adoption of Part 6 of the Telecommunications ACT 1997 (CTH)

Federal Law Review, 2009

I wish to thank Lesley Hitchens, Angus Corbett and the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article; Anne Hurley and the staff of the Communications Alliance for providing me with access to internal Alliance documentation and the librarians at the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts and the Australian Communications and Media Authority (Sydney) for permitting me to use their collections.